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THE BABY DOE REGULATIONS AND TRAGIC
CHOICES AT THE BEDSIDE: ACCEPTING THE
LIMITS OF "GOOD PROCESS"
Ellen Waldman*
INTRODUCTION
What is the significance of the Baby Doe Regulations, l regulations
that have now been on the books for a quarter of a century?
Catalyzed by the well-publicized death of a Down's syndrome baby
whose parents declined routine intestinal surgery2, the Regulations
remain a subject of debate. Alternately portrayed as protective civil
rights legislation for the handicapped 3 and a ruinously meddlesome
effort to constrict quality-of-life determinations for gravely ill
newborns, 4 the Regulations add to our ongoing deliberations
regarding the concept of futility in medicine.
Promulgated in 1985, the Regulations threaten the withholding of
federal funds if physicians treating infants less than one year of age
"[fail] to respond to the infant's life-threatening conditions" with
treatment which, "in the treating physician's ... reasonable medical
judgment" are "most likely to be . . .effective in ameliorating or
correcting all such conditions." Exceptions to this global mandate
exist.5 Physicians need not treat infants suffering from life-
threatening conditions in the following three circumstances: 1) "the
infant is chronically and irreversibly comatose"; 2) the provision of
such treatment would "merely prolong dying . . . or be otherwise
futile in terms of the survival of the infant"; 3) the provision of such
treatment would be "virtually futile in terms of the survival of the
* Professor of Law and Mediation Program Director, Thomas Jefferson School of Law.
1. 45 C.F.R. § 1340.15 (2008).
2. See Joseph Pless, The Story of Baby Doe, 309 NEw ENG. J. MED. 664 (1983).
3. Thomas J. Balch, Are There Checks and Balances on Terminating the Lives of Children with
Disabilities? Should There Be?, 25 GA. ST. U. L. REv. 958 (2009).
4. See Loretta M. Kopelman, Thomas G. Irons & Arthur E. Kopelman, Neonatologists Judge the
"Baby Doe " Regulations, 318 NEw ENG. J. MED. 677, 683 (1988).
5. 45 C.F.R. § 1340.15(b)(1)-(2).
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infant and the treatment itself under such circumstances would be
inhumane."
6
The American Academy of Pediatrics and other commentators
have interpreted the Regulations to allow for the exercise of clinical
discretion. They point to the use of terms like "appropriate,"
"reasonable medical judgment," and "inhumane" to argue that the
Regulations should not be read as requiring a full-court medical press
in the face of unremittingly dire prognoses. 7 Critics, most markedly
fellow symposium contributor Dr. Loretta Kopelman, counter that
textual hints of flexibility are misleading. The rule's language, they
argue, reveals a pro-life imperative that allows for little in the way of
individualized, contextual decision-making. 8
As a matter of statutory interpretation, it must be said that
Professor Kopelman and her fellow critics have the better argument.
9
The use of the phrases "futile in terms of ... survival" and "virtually
futile" and "inhumane" appear to require medical intervention, so
long as the intervention sustains life and is not itself sadistic. Reading
the text literally, the Regulations allow little room for qualitative
assessments of the sort of life that awaits the fragile infant facing a
phalanx of medical impairments.
But, from a conflict resolution perspective, the constricting nature
of the Baby Doe language hardly matters. Had the regulations been
written in more nuanced fashion, the practical import of the text
6. Id. § (b)(2)(i)-(iii).
7. See American Academy of Pediatrics, Committee on Bioethics, Ethics and the Care of Critically
l Infants and Children, 98 PEDIATRICS 149, 149-52 (1996); J.A. Robertson, Extremely Prematurity
and Parental Rights after 'Baby Doe, '34 HASTINGS CTR. REPORT 32, 32-39, n.4 (2004).
8. See Kopelman et al., supra note 4. See also John Lantos, Baby Doe Five Years Later:
Implications for Child Health, 317 NEw ENG. J. MED. 444, 447 (1987) ("The federal Baby Doe
regulations had the effect of making neonatal intensive care an absolute right for every child in the land,
and the provision of such care a legal obligation for every doctor and hospital.").
9. The Regulations' use of the phrase "futile in terms of the survival of the infant" suggests that
they exempt from provision only those treatments unable to sustain biologic life. Respiratory support or
artificial nutrition and hydration for a two-month-old suffering from multi-organ failure is effective in
ameliorating imminently life-threatening conditions (in other words, the inability to eat or breathe).
These interventions cannot, then, be said to be futile in terms of perpetuating the survival of the infant.
Asking whether treatments are effective in sustaining physiologic life would appear to remove from
consideration questions regarding the quality of the life sustained and precludes the more penetrating
best interests analysis that would otherwise take place.
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would likely remain the same. Even if the drafters had eschewed the
language of survival l and spoken instead of treatments that are
medically ineffective," l objectionable on the grounds of conscience, 12
or more burdensome than beneficial, 13  that phraseology would
remain a significant barrier to the dialing-back of aggressive care. In
a dispute between clinicians seeking to move to comfort care and
parents who want everything done, it is likely that even the more
ambiguous language of qualitative futility would be seen as affording
parents a bargaining chip in their jockeying with resistant providers.
Despite decades of work, our futility discourse remains a muddle.
14
Efforts to devise a working definition of futile treatment have come
up empty. The only consensus to emerge is that no substantive
consensus is possible. And because we are unable to inject
substantive content into the concept of futile care, the conventional
wisdom holds that all that is left to us is "good process."'
15
Attention has thus turned to alternative dispute resolution
procedures as a means of coping with the clash of expectations at the
bedside. 16 When patients insist on care that clinicians deem futile,
10. Asking whether a treatment is "futile in terms of survival" borrows from notions of physiologic
futility, which looks to whether the treatment will have the desired effect on the body. The Baby Doe
Regulations specify that the desired effect is survival and define futile treatment to be those
interventions that will not be successful in keeping the patient alive.
11. The Uniform Health Care Decisions Act (hereinafter "UHCDA"), adopted in nine states
(Alabama, Alaska, Delaware, Hawaii, Maine, Mississippi, New Mexico, Wyoming and Kansas) allows
health care providers to refuse to follow a patient's advance directive or surrogate decision if doing so
would require the provision of "medically ineffective health care." See Uniform Law Commissioners, A
Few Facts About the Uniform Health Care Decisions Act, http://nccusl.org/Update/uniformact_
factsheets/uniformacts-fs-uhcda.asp (last visited Mar. 17, 2009).
12. UHCDA also provides immunity to physicians who decline to follow an individual instruction
for "reasons of conscience." UHCDA § 9 (1993).
13. See JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRACTICAL REASONING IN BIOETHICS 163 (1997) (urging use of a
benefits versus burdens test to assess appropriateness of proposed medical treatment).
14. See Paul R. Helft et al., The Rise and Fall of the Futility Movement, 343 N.E. J. MED. 293, 296
(2000).
15. AMA Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, Medical Futility in End-of-Life Care: Report of
the Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, 281 JAMA 937, 937-38 (1999).
16. See Jeffrey P. Bums & Robert D. Truog, Futility: A Concept in Evolution, 132 CHEST 1987
(2007); Sadath Sayeed, The Marginally Viable Newborn: Legal Challenges, Conceptual Inadequacies,
and Reasonableness, 34 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 600, 604 (2006) (". . . [R]ather than fiddle with fruitlessly
crafting the elements necessary to declare futility, recent bioethical movements in medicine have sought
to reconcile a determination that life-sustaining intervention should be ended with a fair procedural
20091 1021
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mediation is thought ideally suited to bring parties to a middle
ground. 17 Anchored in precepts of procedural justice and disputant
self-determination, "the talking cure" is considered the best tonic to
calm inflamed passions and bring warring parties to a peaceable end-
point. "
The truth, however, is that mediation's procedural power rests, in
part, on the substantive content of background legal and ethical
norms. 19 Perceptions of prevailing law set the parameters of
discussion. If clinicians believe that judges and juries support the
withholding of care to gravely ill newborns on quality-of-life
grounds, then they will bargain aggressively. Conversely, if they
believe that legal norms support parental demands for all care that
sustains biologic life, they will accede to such demands when pushed.
Mediation, then, is a procedural echo chamber, reflecting and often
instantiating regnant legal norms. 20  For those who believe that
providing treatment to hopelessly ill newborns is bad medicine,
mediation will prove a disappointing palliative. Although useful in
cases where impasse stems from poor communication or mistrust,
mediation is unlikely to lead to withdrawal of treatment in cases
where families and providers are animated by radically divergent
values. In disputes where the family is driven by magical thinking or
the conviction that life in its most compromised forms must be
framework-one that, at a minimum, guarantees families an opportunity to seek alternative care, when
they disagree with physicians' assessments and recommendations in particular cases.").
17. See NANCY N. DUBLER & CAROL B. LIEBMAN, BIOETHICS MEDIATION: A GUIDE TO SHAPING
SHARED SOLUTIONS (2004); see also generally Robert Gatter, Unnecessary Adversaries at the End of
Life: Mediating End-of-Life Treatment Disputes to Prevent Erosion of Patient-Physician Relationship,
79 B.U. L. REv. 1091 (1999).
18. See generally NANCY N. DUBLER & CAROL B. LIEBMAN, supra note 17; see also I. Glenn Cohen,
Negotiating Death: ADR and End of Life Decision-Making, 9 HARv. NEGOTIATION L. REv. 253, 283-
309 (2004).
19. See Robert Cooter, Stephen Marks & Robert Mnookin, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: A
Testable Model of Strategic Behavior, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 225 (1982).
20. Mediators, regardless of their professed stylistic allegiance, routinely confess to serving as the
"agent of reality." In this role, mediators reference existing legal norms and question the parties' view of
how those norms would be applied in their case. As agents of reality, mediators draw heavily on the
frame that the law imposes on the parties' narratives. Thus, regardless of whether mediators admit to
evaluating or passing judgment on the parties' claims, legal rules and their likely interpretation exert a
significant influence over most mediation discussions.
1022 [Vol 25:4
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prolonged, mediation will do little to moderate their demands. 2 1 And,
physicians, because they are risk-averse and feel disadvantaged in the
litigation setting, are unlikely to press their case.
Hard-fought futility disputes inflict casualties. Clinicians
experience a threat to their ethical integrity. 22 Families feel betrayed
by the very caregivers upon whom they have become dependent.23
Sadly, faith in mediation threatens to become the next form of
collateral damage.
If we are not careful, clinicians' disappointment with mediation's
inability to provide a suitable fix may curdle into broader
disillusionment. Those laboring in the medical trenches may come to
see mediation as yet another legal innovation that works poorly in the
medical setting. This would be a shame. The problem with mediation
in the futility context lies not with the process, but with the
background norms that shape its course.
This essay seeks to rescue mediation from the threat of inflated
expectations. Part I begins with a brief description of the mediation
process and the mediator's role in encouraging settlement. Part II
takes up mediation in the context of futility disputes, detailing what
can reasonably be achieved, while pointing out limits. By examining
traditional mediator functions, this part seeks to explain why
mediation's reach in the end-of-life setting so often exceeds its grasp.
This essay concludes with two final points. First, relying on "good
process" when clinicians and families disagree elides, but does not
erase, the substantive decisions that result. Resort to mediation in
many cases reflects a back-handed award of decisional authority to
families and continued investment in care that cannot cure and
21. See Lawrence J. Schneiderman, Jeffrey F. Fein & Nancy Dubler, The Limits of Dispute
Resolution, HASTINGS CTR. REPORT 10-12, Nov.-DEC. 2001.
22. See Mary Van Soeren & Adele Miles, The Role of Teams in Resolving Moral Distress in
Intensive Care Unit Decision-Making, 7 CRITICAL CARE 217, 217-18 (2003); Terese Hudson & Kevin
Lumsdon, Are Futile Care Policies the Answer? Providers Struggle with Decisions for Patients Near the
End of Life, 68 HOSP. & HEALTH NETWORKS, Feb. 20, 1994, at 26-28 ("[P]hysicians who offer futile,
meaningless care are charlatans, and this makes charlatans of us.") (quoting Dr. John Popovich).
23. See Arthur Caplan, Odds and Ends: Trust and the Debate Over Medical Futility, 125 ANNALS
INTERNAL MED. 688, 688-89 (1996) (discussing erosion of trust between physicians and patients and
physicians and families).
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technology that cannot heal. This may be the substantive outcome we
want, but we should acknowledge the choice. Second, if we
acknowledge our normative choices, then perhaps we can revisit our
earlier "Hail Mary pass" from substance to process. Unmasking the
'tragic choices' hidden under cover of 'good process' may prompt us
to reinvigorate our quest for a workable definition of futility. Forging
a consensus about the proper role of medicine at the margins of
meaningful existence will not be easy; it is likely that no one
conception will satisfy every constituency. Still, better to continue to
forge ahead with this work then obfuscate the choices we do make
and set mediation up as the "fall guy" for a problem not of its
making.
I. BACKGROUND
A. How Mediation Proceeds
Mediation is a form of assisted negotiation. A third party with no
ties to the dispute or disputants participates in a structured discussion
designed to identify common ground and forge a mutually agreeable
resolution. 24 Modem-day mediation takes many forms, 25 but most
versions consist of at least four central stages: 1) Introduction; 2)
Information Gathering and Exchange; 3) Problem Solving and Option
Generation 4) Persuasion and Option Selection.26 In each stage, the
24. See CARRIE MENKEL-MEADOW, ANDREA KUPFER SCHNEIDER & LELA P. LOVE, MEDIATION:
PRACTICE, POLICY & ETHICS 91 (2006) ("[M]ediation is a process in which an impartial third party acts
as a catalyst to help others constructively address and perhaps resolve a dispute, plan a transaction, or
define the contours of a relationship.").
25. This is not the place to reprise the ongoing scholarly debate over mediation's form and function.
Over the years, mediation enthusiasts have proposed different models that assume different forms and
incorporate different visions of how conflict resolution should proceed. The transformative model
contemplates a party-centered approach with all work taking place in joint session. Versions of the
problem-solving model anticipate a more active, directive mediator who meets extensively with parties
in private caucus. Most in the mediation community today would acknowledge the respectability of each
approach.
26. In their book on mediation, authors Douglas Frenkel and James Stark state that effective
mediations have the following four stages: "Stage One: Opening the Process, Developing Information;
Stage Two: Expanding the Information Base, Identifying Issues, Organizing an Agenda; Stage Three:
1024 [VoL 25:4
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mediator choreographs discussion to overcome cognitive and
affective barriers to agreement. The introduction is designed to
establish rapport with the parties and set the stage for a "settlement
event.",27 The mediator explains her role as third-party facilitator, sets
the ground rules for interaction, discusses confidentiality and
decisional authority, and invites the parties to talk and listen to one
another in new and more productive ways. Importantly, at the end of
the introduction, the parties should feel comfortable with and
confident in the mediator and optimistic that a structured process can
help surmount existing obstacles to settlement.
28
During information gathering and exchange, each party provides
an uninterrupted narrative of the conflict from her own perspective.
The mediator works in this stage to get a fuller picture of the
underlying interests and pushes the parties to better understand their
basic needs and long-term goals. The mediator constructs an agenda
based on the issues identified and encourages the parties to tackle
each issue systematically. In separate meetings, or in joint session,
the mediator will explore and attempt to gain clarity on aspects of the
dispute that may not have previously received attention but may be
blocking forward movement.
29
The exchange segment of this stage is designed to help the parties
see each other in more human terms. Conflict leads parties to
demonize one another.30 It is part of the mediator's task to reverse
that process and help parties gain an appreciation of the other side's
experience. This is pursued through a variety of communicative
techniques, including active listening, positive refraining, and role
reversal. Parties are encouraged to take responsibility for their role in
Problem-Solving and Persuasion; Stage Four: Dealing with Impasse, Closing." DOUGLAS N. FRENKEL &
JAMES H. STARK, THE PRACTICE OF MEDIATION 125 (2008).
27. DWIGHT GOLANN, MEDIATING LEGAL DISPUTES: EFFECTIVE STRATEGIES FOR LAWYERS AND
MEDIATORS 39-59 (1996).
28. See Nat'l Conflict Resolution Center, Mediation Training Manual (2005) (unpublished manual
on file with the author and the National Conflict Resolution Center, San Diego, Cal.).
29. See Nat'l Conflict Resolution Center supra note 28, at 73-77.
30. See LOUIS KRIESBERG, SOCIAL CONFLICT 69-72 (2d ed. 1982).
20091 1025
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the dispute and to see resolution as a task requiring joint
collaboration and accommodation.
31
When the parties demonstrate that they are able to work
productively together, the mediator will initiate the next stage which
is devoted to option generation and problem-solving. In this stage the
mediator encourages the parties to make proposals designed to satisfy
the interests that were earlier identified during the information
exchange. 32 Typically, the mediator will impose a no-critique rule, on
the theory that creativity flourishes in an environment free of
judgment or criticism. 33 As part of the effort to encourage movement
and dislodge parties from their entrenched positions, the mediator
will engage the parties in a discussion of the likely outcome should
the parties fail to reach agreement. This will usually entail
consideration of the relevant legal norms and the probabilities of
success or failure should the dispute proceed to litigation. 34
The final stage involves determining which of the proposed
options is most viable and obtaining party commitment to those
options. This may involve some persuasion on the part of the
mediator. The mediator may point out to the parties that the options
on the table represent the most advantageous terms they can expect,
given the needs and interests of the other side. The mediator also
might point out the benefits of the proposed options as compared to
likely outcomes should the dispute proceed to other forums. 35 If the
parties are able to agree on a set or package of terms, the mediator
31. See MIKE D. BENNETT & SCOTT H. HUGHES, ART OF MEDIATION 95-105 (2d ed. 2006).
32. See Nat'l Conflict Resolution Center, supra note 28, at 48-52.
33. Jennifer Gerarda Brown, Creativity and Problem Solving, 87 MARQ. L. REV. 697, 698 (2004).
34. See Leonard L. Riskin, Mediator Orientations, Strategies and Techniques, 12 ALTERNATIVES TO
HIGH COST LmG. 111-14 (1994) (discussing the principal strategy of evaluative-narrow mediator,
which is "to help the parties understand the strengths and weaknesses of their positions and the likely
outcome at trial"). An elicitative, as opposed to a directive or an evaluative mediator, may refrain from
opining on how legal norms would likely be applied given the relevant facts of the parties' dispute, but
would instead push the parties to consider and defend their understandings of how such norms would be
applied. Either way, legal norms play a prominent role in the discussion. See Leonard L. Riskin,
Decisionmaking in Mediation: The New Old Grid and the New New Grid System, 79 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1, 33 (2003).
35. See Marjorie Aaron, Evaluation in Mediation, in MEDIATING LEGAL DISPUTES: EFFECTIVE
STRATEGIES FOR LAWYERS AND MEDIATORS 267-305 (Dwight Golann ed., 2006).
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will help them record those terms in a memorandum of agreement
and formally conclude the mediation. If no formal agreement is
reached, the mediator typically summarizes areas of common ground
36and suggests alternative pathways for the parties to pursue.
B. Mediator Roles and Functions
Mediators play a variety of roles throughout the process. They
encourage, soothe, prod, probe, cheerlead, and persuade. Each of
these functions can be viewed through a management lens. Mediators
manage information, emotion, and expectations.
1. Managing Information
Parties in discord often wield information in ways that stoke
continued conflict. They shield their vulnerabilities and obfuscate
with aggressive oratory the more modest deal they would in fact cut
to end the wrangling. Wary of being seen as weak, they hide their
true interests under a swath of bellicose rhetoric. This behavior
makes settlement difficult in two ways: first, it obscures the true
bargaining range between the parties' "walk-away" points,37 and
second, it introduces inflammatory language into the negotiation, thus
impairing the parties' ability to focus on the issues at hand.38
Mediators manage information by encouraging parties to disclose
their underlying needs and interests and then selectively revealing
those interests to maximize the potential for agreement. 39 For
example, in the classic case of two children fighting over one orange,
the mediator would elicit from each child her reason for wanting the
fruit and-having learned that one seeks to eat the pulp while the
36. See Nat'l Conflict Resolution Center, supra note 28, at 64-66.
37. Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the Rationality
Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1051, 1078 (2000).
38. See FRENKEL & STARK, supra note 26, at 45 (pointing out that when people are swamped by
strong feelings of anger or fear they are "impaired in their ability to . . . express themselves
dispassionately, without accusation, hostile attribution or threat").
39. See generally Jennifer Gerarda Brown & Ian Ayres, Economic Rationales for Mediation, 80 VA.
L. REv. 323 (1994).
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other yearns to bake cake with the rind--encourage a division that
maximizes each child's goals. In short, the mediator assists in the
development of a rich knowledge base about each party's goals and
strategically transmits information in ways that facilitate value-
creating trades.4 °
Mediators also manage information by filtering out negative,
unproductive critiques and attacks.41 They do this in two ways. In a
joint session where all parties are present, a mediator will reframe a
party's statement to promote valuable data exchange and minimize
inflammatory accusations or insults. Thus, the statement, "This
hospital only cares about billing; it doesn't bother with providing care
to my dad at all" becomes, "You have some concerns that your father
receive appropriate treatment while he is in the hospital." In private
caucus, the mediator would absorb much of the anger ventilated
during one party's private narrative and transmit to the other party
only that information useful in advancing dialogue. Thus, a family's
rant regarding the attending physicians' insensitivity to the patient's
pain levels may be lengthy and cutting. It might contain many
demeaning characterizations of the hospital staff's competence and
humanity. In caucus with the caregivers, however, the mediator will
merely convey the family's fears regarding untreated pain and ask the
caregivers what sorts of future proposals might be made to alleviate
the family's distress. By reducing each side's exposure to belittling
attacks on their behavior, motives or character, the mediator keeps
the conversation on an even keel and moving in a positive direction.
2. Managing Emotions
Negotiators are in a state of "perpetual emotion." 42 Positive
emotions increase sensitivity to the possibility of integrative,
40. See CARRIE MENKEL-MEADOW, DISPUTE PROCESSING AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION: THEORY,
PRACTICE AND POLICY xiii (2003) (citing Stuart Hampshire, JUSTICE AS CONFLICT (2000)). See also
Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 37.
41. See BENNETT & HUGHES, supra note 31, at 101-03.
42. See Daniel L. Shapiro, A Negotiator's Guide to Emotion: Four 'Laws' to Effective Practice, 7
Disp. RESOL. MAG. 3, 4 (2001).
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mutually advantageous resolutions, whereas negative emotions lead
bargainers toward a narrower, more limited perception of what is
possible.43 Intense negative emotion also impairs a negotiator's
ability to analyze, brainstorm and make rational, not retributive,
decisions. 44 Part of the mediator's job, then, is to encourage optimism
and help negotiators articulate, and thus dissipate, their anger, fear
and paranoia.
Mediators help parties regulate emotions in various ways. First,
they encourage emotional modulation by allowing time and space for
ventilation. Mediators ask parties to describe their conflict with
particular emphasis on its emotional impact. Giving parties an
explicit opportunity to describe their turmoil, frustration, anger, or
fear provides some measure of relief.45 Additionally, mediators are
trained to listen attentively and reflect back the feelings they hear-
techniques that help parties feel heard and induce calm.
46
Mediators also help parties sift through the cognitive fog
engendered by strong emotion to better assess and advance their
long-term best interests. Parties gripped by anger or fear may reject
offers or pursue disadvantageous strategies in order to spite their
adversary. 47 Mediators help parties recognize the folly in "cutting off
their nose to spite their face" and urge them, instead, to focus on
pursuing their own gains as opposed to inflicting losses. Mediators
also aid the communication process by helping parties interpret their
43. See generally Clark Freshman, Adele Hayes, & Greg Feldman, The Lawyer-Negotiator As Mood
Scientist: What We Know and Don't Know About How Mood Relates to Successful Negotiation, 2002 J.
DIsP. RESOL. 1 (2002).
44. See FRENKEL & STARK, supra note 26; Kenneth Kipnis & Anita Gerhard, Some Ethical
Principles for Adult Critical Care, in THE VARIABLES OF MORAL CAPACITY 156 (David Thomasma &
David Weisstub eds., 2004).
45. See CAROL TRAVIS, ANGER: THE MISUNDERSTOOD EMOTION 145 (lst ed. 1982). But see
Bushman, Stack, and Baumeister, Catharsis, Aggression and Persuasive Influence: Self Fulfilling Or
Self-Defeating Prophecies, 76 J. OF PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 367-76 (1999) (discussing data that
suggests expressing anger exacerbates rather than diffuses angry feelings).
46. See Gary Friedman & Jack Himmelstein, The Loop of Understanding, in MENKEL-MEADOW ET
AL., MEDIATION: PRACTICE, POLICY AND ETHICS, supra note 24, at 225-28 (describing mediators'
efforts to understand each disputant's experience and convey that understanding to the disputants).
47. See FRENKEL & STARK, supra note 26, at 57-58 (discussing reactive devaluation, in which
disputants view with disfavor substantively attractive proposals because the offer is made by an
adversary).
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adversary's words and actions free of emotionally generated
distortions.4 When parties' "emotional flooding" threatens to
devastate the path toward settlement, the mediator erects a system of
dams and culverts to contain the damage and clear alternative routes
for passage.
3. Managing Expectations
Disputants often enter into negotiations with inflated expectations.
They focus on the facts and legal rules favorable to their position and
shut their eyes to the less appealing aspects of their case.49 New
information is interpreted to accord with existing over-confident
prognostication.
New facts, if they are helpful, provide irrefutable proof that victory
is inevitable. Unhelpful facts become inconveniences easily
explained away.50 Disputants' irrationally exuberant assessments of
their negotiating alternatives lead them to adopt excessively hard-
nosed positions at the bargaining table. This intransigence scuttles
progress. One central task that the mediator performs is helping
parties reach more realistic assessments of their options if settlement
fails.51 This, in turn, eases parties into more reasonable negotiating
postures.
Mediators help parties gain greater clarity regarding their best and
worst alternatives to agreement in a variety of ways. They ask
pointed questions about the strengths and weaknesses of various
positions, pushing parties to think about where they might be
vulnerable before a judge or jury. They highlight the transaction and
opportunity costs of disputing. They ask about the likely investment
in time, money, and emotional energy that continued conflict will
48. See BENNETT & HUGHES, supra note 31, at 86-89 (discussing barriers to effective receipt of
messages in conflict situations); see also Lee Ross, Reactive Devaluation in Negotiation and Conflict
Resolution, in KENNETH J. ARROW, BARRIERS TO CONFLICT RESOL. 28-29 (1995).
49. See generally Russell Korobkin, Psychological Impediments to Mediation Success, 21 OHIO ST.
J. ON Disp. RESOL. 281 (2006).
50. See generally Raymond S. Nickerson, Confirmation Bias: A Ubiquitous Phenomenon in Many
Guises, 2 REV. OF GEN. PSYCHOL. 175 (1998).
51. See FRENKEL & STARK, supra note 26, at 235-41.
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impose. And if they are comfortable taking an evaluative role, they
offer predictions of what a court or other decision-making entity
might do if the dispute is pushed onto an adversary track.52
These interventions tamp down party expectations and curtail
egocentric bias. They encourage a degree of self-interrogation and
introduce some level of uncertainty into the parties' thinking. When
parties begin to entertain doubt regarding the rightness of their cause
and the inevitability of success, they become open to more
conciliatory and collaborative approaches.53
II. MEDIATION IN FUTILITY DISPUTES-
WHAT MEDIATION CAN AND CANNOT Do
Mediation can be usefully deployed in futility disputes, but it is
important to be realistic about what the process can and cannot
accomplish. In a large percentage of disputes, where strong emotion,
information asymmetries, and inflated expectations distort families'
or caregivers' assessments, mediation will likely reduce disagreement
and bring about some resolution. In the smaller percentage of
intractable disputes where family investment in continued treatment
is unalterably high, mediation's management strategies will likely not
be successful in moving the family from its initial demand. More
likely, the family will hold firm and clinical caregivers will
capitulate. If we analyze the mediation of futility disputes through the
lens of the mediator's management functions, the limits of what
mediation can accomplish become clear.
A. Managing Information
Families and caregiver often find themselves in conflict because
earlier efforts at communication have been unsuccessful and the
parties hold divergent understandings of the basic facts. Sometimes,
families have received different information about the patient's
52. See Riskin, Mediator Orientations, Strategies and Techniques, supra note 34, at 111-14.
53. See Korobkin, supra note 49, at 295.
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prognosis from myriad specialists, and they remain confused
regarding the true nature of the patient's condition. The cardiologist
may speak optimistically because the heart's ejection fraction
numbers are holding steady; the renal specialist gives encouraging
news because urine output is stable and the neurologist is pleased that
the intercranial bleed appears to be stage III and not stage IV. None
of these specialists, however, has conveyed to the family that the
patient lacks the ability to survive absent ministrations only available
in an intensive care unit.
In these instances, the mediator's efforts to broaden the
information base can yield significant gains. Sometimes, when the
family learns the complete medical picture, they decide that a full
court medical press is not consistent with either the patient's wishes
or best interests. Sometimes, when clinicians discover the family's
underlying interests, they can find ways to accommodate those
interests without forsaking either medical judgment or rectitude. For
example, a family's wish to keep a beloved patriarch or matriarch
alive until an important event occurs (like a birth or the arrival of a
distant relative) can almost always be accommodated. The timing of
treatment withdrawal can also be modified to account for the family's
interest in achieving certitude regarding the patient's future
prospects.54 Once the family's resistance to withdrawing care is
properly understood, then efforts to satisfy those underlying concerns
can begin.
In some cases, however, the mediator's efforts to broaden the
information base and alert each party to the other's needs will not be
nearly enough. In the most intractable cases, the family is impervious
to the mediator's efforts to fill out the medical picture. In these cases,
even the most direct discussions about the patient's condition do not
shake the family's conviction that recovery is possible. Some families
are waiting for a miracle.55 Some maintain that the patient is "a
54. See James L. Nelson, Families and Futility, 42 J. Am. GERIATRICS SoC'Y 879-82 (1994).
55. See, e.g., In re Baby K, 832 F. Supp. 1022, 1026 (E.D. Va. 1993) ("The mother opposes the
discontinuation... because she believes that all human life has value... [and] that God will work a
miracle.").
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fighter" and "will beat the odds. 56 Others simply do not trust the
medical profession and the information they generate. 57
In other circumstances, families accept the medical picture
presented, but disagree about the implications. Families may agree
with clinicians that the patient is in a non-sentient state and will in all
likelihood remain so-and yet still believe that withdrawal is not
appropriate. These families typically hold that biologic life, in
whatever form it takes, should be medically sustained.58 A corollary
belief is that withdrawing treatment would entail "taking life"-and
that is a task for deities, not mere doctors, to perform. 59 Families and
clinicians who hold different beliefs regarding medicine's role in
sustaining severely impaired life will continue to disagree, even when
the mediator has successfully plugged information gaps and ensured
accurate data transmission. Miscommunication can be a serious
problem in end-of-life disputes. But, even when the mediator
successfully clarifies the relevant facts, knotty value conflicts may
remain.
Whether mediation "works" with value conflicts is a matter of
debate. Some commentators contend that value conflicts can be
circumvented by searching for practical solutions that do minimal
damage to each side's ethical commitments. 60 In the end-of-life
context, however, if the family believes that withdrawal of life-
support is murder, then little room exists for measures that pull back
from aggressive care. And if clinicians feel that continued care is
56. See Clare Dyer, Doctors Need Not Ventilate Baby to Prolong His Life, 329 BRIT. MED. J. 995
(2004) (reporting that mother of terminally ill infant rejected medical advice because her baby was a
"fighter" and "had lived longer than doctors had predicted.").
57. See Mary Ellen Wojtasiewicz, Damage Compounded: Disparities, Distrust, and Disparate
Impact in End-of-Life Conflict Resolution Policies, 6 No. 5 AM. J. BIoETHICS 8, 8-12 (SEPT.-OCT.
2006) (discussing the distrust of the health care system by minority groups, especially African
Americans).
58. See, e.g., Rideout v. Hershey Med. Ctr., 30 Pa. D. & C. 4th 57, 62 (1995) (parents refused to
consent to removal of life support for daughter because of "religious belief that all human life has value
and should be protected").
59. Emily Ramshaw, Children Fight to Save Mom: Carrollton: Hospital Seeks to End Care of
Woman with Brain Injury, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Aug. 18, 2006, at IB ("Ruthie Webster is deeply
religious and believes only God should give and take life.").
60. See CHRISTOPHER W. MOORE, THE MEDIATION PROCESS: PRACTICAL STRATEGIES FOR
RESOLVING CONFLICT 378 (3d ed. 2003).
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medically and ethically inappropriate, then any agreement that
prolongs the patient's life will lead clinicians to feel that they are
violating professional norms. Where the family and medical staff
hold fundamentally different values regarding the sanctity of life and
the goals of medicine, even the most skillful efforts to facilitate
information exchange will not provide a sufficient bridge to
resolution.
B. Managing Emotions
Futility disputes catalyze an intense mix of emotions. Grief, guilt,
anger and anxiety all typically play some role. For surviving spouses,
children, siblings or parents, the patient's loss rips at the fabric of
their individual and communal life.61 For many, the care of the
patient-cooking meals, filling prescriptions, grooming, bathing,
paying bills, and driving to doctors appointments-has become their
sustaining life-task. The patient's death entails a disorienting loss of
structure and meaning. Additionally, if the patient was the rock or
glue of the family, then her absence heralds the neglect of family
rituals or traditions and the disintegration of established networks.
62
Guilt and remorse are also potently at work. It is an old story in
hospital social work departments that the most ardent advocates for
aggressive care tend to be the prodigal son (or daughter) recently
returned from a lengthy siesta from their parents' lives. 63 These
estranged children, coping with their own unresolved issues and
regrets, seek to prolong treatment to reinvent a relationship they
never had. Bitter recriminations, buried yearnings, and squandered
61. See Barbara Given et al., Burden and Depression Among Caregivers of Patients with Cancer at
the End ofLife, 31 ONCOLOGY NURSING F., 1105, 1105-17 (2004).
62. With newborns, the context underlying the family's intense emotionality is different.
Contemplating the death of a child is always tragic. But, for some families the tragedy is more profound.
Some couples look to the birth of a child to save a crumbling marriage. Other would-be parents are
looking to the care-giving role to ease some other existential pain--the loss of a parent, a professional
failure or the like.
63. See D.W. Molloy et al., Decision Making in the Incompetent Elderly: The Daughter from
California Syndrome, 39 J. AM. GERIATRICS Soc'Y, 396, 396-99 (1991).
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possibilities for reconciliation hang over the bedside. 64 Those who are
left crave absolution. For some, release comes only in assuming the
mantle of crusader. 65 The fight for more medical care becomes a way
of achieving a solidarity elusive during healthier times, and
maintaining a defiant position becomes a way of managing the
intensity of the loss.
Families are frequently beset by anger as well. The indignity and
decay of illness is infuriating. The stealthy ebbing of a life feels
outrageous, and that sense of outrage colors their interactions with
the health-care system. Even when content with the care being
provided, families chafe against the lottery that has consigned them
to the grieving role.
The situation is, of course, much more inflamed if the family
suspects that medical mismanagement has played a role. Where the
family blames the care team for iatrogenic harms, mistrust and rage
increase exponentially. Even where bad outcomes in no way imply
medical neglect, the family may seize upon caregiver inaction as the
proximate cause of their grief.
For the care team, familial insistence on medically ineffective care
engenders myriad responses. The most common responses are
frustration, anger, and distress. Physicians do not perceive themselves
as mere technicians but, rather, as professionals whose judgments are
informed by an internally cohesive set of values and principles. When
they are called upon to deliver care they deem inappropriate or worse,
they feel a threat to these values and their own status as professionals.
Clinicians have objected to demands for futile care on the grounds
64. Again, when a newborn, rather than an aging relative, is gravely ill, the guilt and remorse flow
from a different psychological well-spring. A woman who delivers a very sick infant is at risk of
blaming herself for the child's fragile state. If the mother used fertility-enhancing drugs resulting in
multiple births, she may feel that her 'unnatural act' led to the infant's health problems. And, if she
needed the fertility drugs because she delayed motherhood to pursue professional opportunities, she may
feel that her selfishness lies at the root of her child's difficulties. Delivering a premature and gravely ill
newborn often feels like a cosmic punishment, and parents are adept at identifying past sins that demand
terrible expiation. Klaus Hinde, Prematurity and Serious Medical Conditions in Infancy: Implications
for Development, Behavior and Intervention, in HANDBOOK OF INFANT MENTAL HEALTH 176, 184
(Charles H. Zeanah, Jr. ed., 2d ed. 2000).
65. See Kenneth Kipnis & Anita Gerhard, supra note 44, at 156.
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that "we are not medical vending machines." 66 That cris de coer
represents a deeply-felt sentiment among physicians that their views
regarding the proper aims of medicine deserve respect.
Mediation can make some headway in taming this emotional
maelstrom, but its calming powers are not limitless. A mediator can
help an agitated disputant consider an adversary's actions from a less
sinister perspective. She can point out alternative interpretations and
nurture empathy where blame would otherwise reside. If family
members come to the table crippled by hurts decades in the making,
though, a mediator will not be able to knit those wounds. And where
life has been built around the scaffold of another's presence, denying
death may be the only tool available to stave off collapse.
In her memoir, The Year of Magical Thinking, Joan Didion details
how her daughter's grave illness and husband's sudden death plunged
her into an Alice in Wonderland rabbit hole of fictional musings. She
held on to her dead husband's shoes on the chance that he would turn
up and need foot-coverings, and she disliked public obituaries
because they seemed to negate the possibility of his return.67 The
reality of his passing seemed malleable, something that could change
shape depending on the weather or angle of the sun.
Mediation is not long-term therapy; it is a short-term, goal-oriented
intervention. It can lower the frustration that accompanies
misunderstanding and soften resentments engendered by casual
disregard. It cannot, however, rationalize magical thinking or
surmount rigidly maintained psychological defenses. Denying death
may be the last life-affirming act left to a bereaved relative.
Mediation cannot (and perhaps should not) be tasked with breaking
through that denial.
66. See e.g. LAWRENCE J. SCHNEIDERMAN & NANCY S. JECKER, WRONG MEDICINE: DOCTORS,
PATIENTS AND FUTILE TREATMENT 20-21 (1995).
67. JOAN DIDION, THE YEAR OF MAGICAL THINKING 34-37 (2005).
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C. Managing Expectations
Mediators manage expectations by pointing to existing legal norms
and suggesting that the parties' anticipated recovery in a court of law
is likely more fictive than real. She will highlight the costs of
pursuing litigation and point out each side's legal and factual
vulnerabilities. 68 In settings where legal norms are relatively clear
and where both disputants experience some degree of risk aversion,
this tactic successfully encourages settlement.
Expectations are not easily managed in futility disputes, and efforts
to point out the risks of litigation do not push both parties equally
toward settlement. Rather, when mediators play "the agent of
reality," families are emboldened and clinicians are cowed. This is so
for a variety of reasons.
First, the law (and ethics) surrounding physician's rights to
terminate treatment over familial objections is unclear, and this lack
of clarity makes it hard to tamp down familial confidence that they
would prevail in court.6 9 Some cases appear to support the right, but
others push in the opposite direction. 70 A number of states have
passed statutes that affirm physicians' right to withhold care that is
"medically ineffective" or offends the conscience, but those terms are
fatally vague and leave much room for challenge. 7' As a result,
mediators cannot offer the statutes as a "safe harbor" and physicians
find no sanctuary in their text.
68. See FRENKEL & STARK, supra note 26, at 235-37; see also Marjorie Aaron, ADR Toolbox: The
Highwire Act of Evaluation, 14 ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LITIG. 62 (1996).
69. See Robert Sibbald et al., Perceptions of "Futile Care" Among Caregivers in Intensive Care
Units, 177 CANADIAN MED. ASS'N J. 1201 (2007).
70. See Patrick Moore, Note, An End-of-Life Quandary in Need of a Statutory Response: When
Patients Demand Life-Sustaining Treatment That Physicians Are Unwilling to Provide, 48 B.C. L. REV.
433, 451 (2007) (discussing cases in which physicians sought to withdraw or withhold aggressive
treatment over surrogate objections and concluding that they "send an inconsistent, if not incoherent
message to healthcare providers about how to handle these end-of-life situations"); but see Thaddeus
Mason Pope, Involuntary Passive Euthanasia in U.S. Courts: Reassessing the Judicial Treatment of
Medical Futility Cases, 9 MARQ. ELDER'S ADVISOR 229 (2008) (arguing that a close review of the
futility cases from 1983 through 2008 reveals that "courts have generally neither prohibited nor
punished the unilateral refusal of [life sustaining medical treatment]").
71. See, e.g., Thaddeus Mason Pope, Medical Futility Statutes: No Safe Harbor to Unilaterally
Refuse Life-Sustaining Treatment, 75 TENN. L. REV. 1 (2007).
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Because the statutory and common law surrounding futility
disputes is so murky, all mediators can do is tell both clinicians and
family that a decision to litigate entails a bold roll of the dice. In the
face of this information, families are inclined to "hold 'em" while
clinicians are likely to "fold 'em.,
72
Asymmetries in risk tolerance explain this divergence. Families are
willing to take the chance of a court ruling against them because
"winning" is the only thing that counts. Their loved one's life is at
stake and no cost is too high, no risk too great. They are locked in a
life or death struggle, and the possibility of pursuing war in another
venue is no deterrent. (It is also true that ample numbers of plaintiffs
attorneys will take high profile futility cases on contingency.)
From where physicians sit, the risk calculus looks much different.
Given the current fragmentation of care, it is unlikely that the
clinician troubled by current levels of treatment has a "thick," 73 long-
standing relationship with the patient. 74 More likely, the objecting
physician has "rounded into" what she experiences as an ethical
dilemma, but can look forward to "rounding out" in the near future.75
72. The phrase "know when to hold 'em and know when to fold 'em" comes from a Kenny Rogers
song, "The Gambler." The song, in the best country tradition, talks about poker as a metaphor for life. A
good poker player holds cards that seem good enough to win and folds- meaning quits the round-with
cards that don't seem good enough to best the competition. KENNY ROGERS, THE GAMBLER (United
Artists 1978).
73. A "thick" relationship would be one in which the participants knew one another well enough to
be able to interpret isolated statements and behavior into a larger intelligible context. Clifford Gertz
famously argued for "thick"-rather than "thin"-ethnographic descriptions in which social actions
were understood and informed by a larger cultural vocabulary. As Geertz wrote, the test of whether a
particular cultural analysis counts as "thick description" is whether it "sorts winks from twitches and
real winks from mimicked ones." Clifford Geertz, Thick Description: Toward an Interpretive Theory of
Culture, in READINGS IN THE PHIL. OF Soc. So. 222 (Michael Martin & Lee McIntyre eds., 1973). In a
thick relationship, the doctor would have a knowledge of the patient over time and a sense of the
narrative arc of the patient's life. A thick relationship would allow physicians greater confidence in
assessing the patient's and families preferences as well as the patient's best wishes. Additionally, a thick
relationship would increase the physician's emotional investment in ensuring an ethical (and
compassionate) outcome. Where the physician is new to the patient and the family, it is difficult to
separate out the twitches from the winks, and harder to find the energy to care about the distinction.
74. The primary physician--the caretaker with the most long-standing relationship with the
patient-is often not consulted after hospital admission. Instead, hospitalists and specialists, newcomers
to the patient-as-person, take over.
75. In many hospitals, interns and residents work for several days or a week with the same patient
before moving to a different part of the hospital. Specialists may issue a consulting opinion and provide
1038 [VoL 25:4
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Even if the physician anticipates having to care for the patient over an
extended period, providing medical treatment that she finds
distasteful remains preferable to buying a front row seat at counsel's
table.
Legal commentators have difficulty grasping the full extent of
physicians' aversion to the adversarial judicial system. Physicians do
not want to be sued, even if they are sure to win. Avoidant impulses
only increase with the possibility of an adverse judgment. Even the
task of obtaining a declaratory judgment is viewed with dread. The
transaction costs of litigation are simply too high; even in the face of
real moral distress, most clinicians prefer the distress of dispensing
what they view as "bad medicine" in the clinic to the distress they
anticipate experiencing in the courtroom.
CONCLUSION
Although disputes over futile treatment are agonizing, time-
consuming, and ever more frequent,76 bioethicists have written off
the pursuit of substantive clarity as a dead letter. Our societal
reluctance to acknowledge limits at the end of life paralyzes efforts to
identify acceptable stopping points on the treatment horizon. But
though the creation of substantive standards appears out of reach, we
remain hopeful that "good process" can ameliorate these conflicts.
There are two things to say about this move. First, abandoning
substance for process is itself a substantive choice. As explained
above, asymmetries in risk afford families considerable leverage in
informal bargaining. In cases of intractable conflict, families
negotiate aggressively while clinicians respond timidly. Most often,
vocal and insistent families get the care they want. The move to
process, then, is, in effect, a move to empower families to
successfully resist physician efforts to limit treatment.
limited coverage, but they do not constitute an ongoing presence. They do not care for the patient
consistently or continuously; they do not see the arc of the patient's struggle or decline.
76. See Gordon Duval et al., 175 J. MED. ETHics 24, 25 (July 2001).
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This may be the substantive outcome that we want, but we should
transparently acknowledge our choice. There are reasons to yield
compassionately to family demands for treatment that physicians find
inappropriate. Some have argued that part of a clinician's job at the
end of life is to "treat the family"-and there may be situations where
providing treatment that can do the patient little good, but helps the
family is the right thing to do.
Adopting a policy of always giving in to family demands, though,
is suspect. Treating the family by continuing to treat the patient can
yield very bad outcomes. First, the treatment may be painful and may
cause the patient to suffer. Second, the treatment may be undignified
and despoil a memory that the patient herself wanted to preserve.
Third, the treatment may entail an expenditure of health care dollars
that could be much better deployed elsewhere. In an era where health
care spending continues to spiral to dizzying heights, decisions to
allocate intensive care unit (ICU) beds, nursing services, and other
hard and soft resources to patients who will never recover sentience
requires careful thought.
A common objection to the quest for a substantive definition of
futile treatment lies in the term's radical subjectivity. We cannot say
that a given treatment is futile for a given patient, because that would
require we agree on what sorts of medical effects are worth pursuing.
This would require us to consider what investments should be made
to sustain biologically functional but nonsentient existence and how
much "quality of life" we should demand for the cost. These are
questions of value and implicate vastly divergent moral
commitments. Physicians, it is said, have no special expertise in
moral reasoning or judgment. Consequently, their claims regarding
"futile treatment" should, it is thought, enjoy no greater weight than
those held by the general public.
This may be a compelling argument against granting physicians'
exclusive authority to craft enforceable definitions of futile treatment.
But it does not entail wholesale abandonment of the definition-
crafting project.
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Our society is continually confronted with the challenge of crafting
definitions in areas where individuals' moral intuitions radically
diverge. When are media so graphically sexual that state censorship
is justified? Which types of religious practices deserve
accommodation and which must yield to our rigorously pluralistic
concept of the state? Most contentiously, when does life begin and
how should moral obligations to the fetus be balanced with concerns
for maternal autonomy? These are all questions of value and yet we
continue to work on content-laden rules to which we advert in
situations of conflict. Why is futility so different?
It may be the futility debate has stalled because advocates for a
substantive definition have attempted to move too far and too fast.
77
Ruling out a treatment because it has not worked in the last 100 cases
strikes some as too draconian and defeatist. Medicine is
unpredictable. Who can say that the 101 st time will not be a charm?
Ruling out a treatment because the burdens outweigh the benefits
seems too vague and indeterminate: too much hangs on the whims of
the decision maker. Some hospital or institutional policies rule out
treatments that will never release the patient from the tubes and
drapes of the ICU. But some will say that life in the ICU remains
worthwhile, if family can still visit and feel connected to an afflicted
loved one.
What if our quest for substantive consensus were more modest?
What if we began with the proposition that hospitals and doctors will
not sustain individuals in permanently nonsentient states beyond a
certain time period? The medical profession could propose a set
77. Our distinctly American unwillingness to acknowledge or talk about limits at the end of life has
been showcased in the recent hysteria surrounding the Obama administration's health reform bill. The
bill contains a provision that would provide Medicare financing for optional consultations with
physicians about hospice care and decisions to pursue aggressive treatment or comfort-care. This
provision has been presented as the first step toward state-sponsored euthanasia. Opponents of reform
have successfully aroused public fear and condemnation with inaccurate references to bureaucratic
"death panels." As the media have pointed out, whipping up public mania by suggesting that proposed
legislation will result in government-controlled rationing at the end of life is a tried and true political
tactic. Given our national aversion to setting limits and big government, linking the two is sure to
inspire quick and fierce objection. See Jim Rutenberg & Jackie Calmes, False 'Death Panel'Rumor Has
Some Familiar Roots, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 14, 2009, at Al.
20091
HeinOnline -- 25 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 1041 2008-2009
)   1041 
  t    
 ls' ll  
 i  
    
ti   i  
t  
 
    
ti  t      t  
 
      
i iti  a e atte pted to move too far and too fast. 77 
t  
i  i   
.  
    
   :  f 
l   
t  t  
  
,   t  
 
t i   t  t ti     t  
   
 tl  t  
t i  ti  i        
  t   
  i  t  t t i  i    '    .  
ill t i s  i i  t t l     
     .  
i i    t       r  .    
 ll    ti n s  r tic 
t  l ."  t  i   i t  t, i i   li       
l i l ti    i  t-contro led       l 
t ti . i  r ti l r i  t  tti  li it   i  t, li i  t  t  i   t  
i ir  i   i  j ti .  i  t erg  i  l , lse ' th el' or  
 iliar t , . . i ES, . , , t I. 
23
Waldman: The Baby Doe Regulations and Tragic Choices at the Bedside:  Acce
Published by Reading Room, 2009
GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
period of time-three months perhaps-and solicit reactions from the
lay community. After a period of time working with this norm, the
medical profession could propose additional content, perhaps
addressing the problem of aggressive treatment in the context of
irreversible multi-organ failure. Again, the profession could propose
a norm and solicit input and response from patient groups, disability
activists, elder law attorneys, and other groups. Over time, in step-by-
step progression, we might as a society grow more comfortable with
limits.
Good process is essential. The process we should be focusing on is
a measured dialogic process of norm formation-a process crafted to
engage the widest swath of society possible. We all have loved ones
who will die, and we will all experience the dying process ourselves.
Moreover, we all contribute to and partake in a health care system
with limited resources. We should, then, encourage and participate in
a national conversation about when, in the medical context, enough is
enough: what sort of life is worth preserving and at what cost.
Until we collectively agree that the formation of substantive norms
is possible and desirable, we will continue to look to mediation as the
magic bullet for disputes at the end of life. When mediation fails in
this context, it is important to remember the structural constraints that
dictate its course. In the long run, perhaps these failures will push us
back on the road toward thinking about substantive standards.
Perhaps then we can link good process with sensible substance-a
"win-win" outcome that mediation would applaud.
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